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Abstract
We examine electricity market reform in Brazil: from the 1990s till 2004
the largely hydro-powered market cleared using a market mechanism, and in
March 2004 reformed to a single buyer structure. We model day-ahead returns
using a Two-State Markov Switching Model with dummy variable analysis,
allowing water storage and natural inflows to affect returns and volatility. Our
results indicate the single buyer structure decreased volatility during stable
periods but worsened energy crises. Post-reform, we find a more forgiving
environment for the allocation of stored energy given natural water inflows,
however sub-optimal water management leads to energy crises developing.
The debate around optimal energy market structures is one that captures the
attention of regulators, retailers and generators around the world. The argument
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for government control centres around lessening market power to increase consumer
surplus. In contrast, the argument for privatisation is based on efficiency gains
leading to increased total surplus in the market. Comparing the two structures has
always been problematic because it is difficult to compare a single buyer model in one
country with a free market in another, while remaining confident that results aren’t
biased by cultural differences, geographic effects, or political influences. This article
examines Brazil, which is a singular case: the Brazilian market from 1990s-2004 is
a free market, while since March 2004 it has a single buyer structure. Our paper
aims to evaluate the effect on electricity returns and electricity return volatility from
shifting to a single buyer model, by conducting a case study of the Brazilian market
reform.
Brazil is the 10th largest energy consumer globally, and generates approximately
71% of its electricity from hydropower (World Factbook (2013-14)). Due to the warm
climate in Brazil, electricity use generally peaks between November and February,
when it is used for cooling. The market is connected by the Sistema Interligado Na-
cional (National Interconnected System) and divided into four regions. This study
uses data from the Operador Nacional do Sistema Ele´trico (the National Grid Op-
erator, denoted ONS). The market undergoes reform in the 1990s and in 2004. The
1990s reforms are designed to encourage private investment and increase produc-
tivity in the market, but are not as straightforward as planned primarily due to
the complexity of the market (De Souza and Legey (2010)). The early 2000s see
rationing of electricity due to a supply shortage from June 2001 to February 2002,
which leads to further reforms to the market in March 2004. These second reforms
create two seperate contracting environments for the purchase of electricity; the Free
Contracting Environment (denoted FCE) and the Regulated Contracting Environ-
ment (denoted RCE). The RCE is the environment that retailers (and by extension
household consumers) must contract in, and prices are set by the regulator. The
FCE is used by large companies who contract directly with the generators. Our
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project aims to evaluate the effect on electricity prices and electricity price volatility
of shifting from the conventional electricity market to the single buyer model, using
data from the free market and the RCE. The RCE is comparable due to the high
degree of control exercised by the regulators in price setting.
While other studies examine the 1990s reforms, as yet little work has studied
the ’04 reform. We use data spanning ten years after the reform, and use a Markov
Switching Model for electricity returns in the market to examine the reform effect.
Since electricity prices are often characterised as facing periods of extreme volatility,
interspersed with quiet periods, we model two states in the market, in which we allow
control variables to influence electricity returns in different ways. The flexibility
of the Switching Model is attractive as it allows each state to vary in mean and
volatility, and indeed allows us to shape the nature of these. Behaviour of electricity
prices is characterised by high volatility, strong seasonality, mean reversion and price
spikes (Le Pen and Se´vi (2010)), making the modelling of these prices particularly
interesting. Figure 1 shows the raw price series by region, from our dataset.
This quantitative approach complements the papers in this field, such as Rego
and Parente (2013), who analyse the outcome of Brazilian electricity procurement
auctions in the context of electricity generation from new and old generators, us-
ing graphical analysis and dummy variable regression analysis. Though their data
spans till 2010, there is little direct emphasis on the 2004 reform effect. Santos, Had-
dad, and Hewings (2013) study the long-run regional effects of the tariff policy of the
Brazilian electricity market, focusing on the reform process that started in the 1990s.
Ramos-Real, Tovar, Iootty, de Almeida, and Pinto (2009) examine productivity of
the Brazilian market, using a panel of firms between 1998–2005. Coordination of
generation in subsystems is studied by Carpio and Pereira (2007). Serra (2013) dis-
cusses the theoretical impact of contract market power on the efficiency of electricity
sectors. Tovar, Ramos-Real, and De Almeida (2011) analyse the effect of firm size
on productivity using Brazilian data spanning till 2005.
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Figure 1: Spot prices by region
We find that the reform appears to decrease volatility in spot price returns in
quiet periods. However, the market still spends some periods in an unstable state
both pre- and post- reform. This unstable state worsens after the introduction of the
RCE. We also characterise the reform by the creation of a more forgiving environment
for the allocation of stored energy given levels of natural inflows, the key catalyst
for entering the unstable state. However in spite of this more forgiving environment,
storage management has often led to situations where prolonged energy crises could
develop.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 outlines our methodology
for the Markov Model and section 2 describes our dataset. In Section 3 we analyse
the construction of our model and the key results, then Section 4 concludes.
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1 Methodology
We use a Two-State Regime Switching Model with Markov chain probabilties of
state persistence, to model the day-ahead returns in an electricity market. We allow
each state to have seperate return and volatility equations. The allocation between
states is determined by an unobserved state variable denoted s.
We use a modified Two-State Regime Switching model (see Hamilton (1989))
with normally distributed residuals. Accordingly, we model the returns as follows:
rt,s = µs + βsXt + s
s ∼ N(0, σ2s)
σs = e
(δsXt)
s ∈ {1, 2},
where rs are the deseasonalised returns, µs is the intercept in the model, and X
is a matrix or vector of covariates. s represents the residuals in the return equation.
Throughout the paper we will use βs to describe coefficients in the returns equation
and δs for coefficients in the volatility equation. s denotes the unobserved state
variable.
The simplest Regime Switching Model follows a Markov Chain, where the proba-
bility that s equals some value j is dependent on the state from the previous period,
as below:
P (st = j | st−1 = i, st−2 = k, . . .) = P (st = j | st−1 = i) = Pij.
We use a Markov Switching Model in our estimation (see Hamilton (1989)).
The transition probabilities are {pij}i,j=1,2 in our two state case. These give us the
probability that state i will be followed by state j.1 These transition probabilities
1Note that pi1 + pi2 = 1.
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are combined into the transition matrix P.
P =
 P11 P21
P12 P22.

These parameters are then estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. We
use the method laid out by Hamilton (1994). Accordingly we maximise the following
log-likelihood function for the observed data to estimate the parameters θ,
L(θ) =
T∑
t=1
log f(rt | Xt,Yt−1; θ), (1)
where Yt denotes information avaliable at time t, and:
f(rt | xt,Yt−1; θ) = 1′(ξˆt|t−1  ηt). (2)
where ξt|t denotes the vector of conditional probabilities, inferred by the analysts
knowledge of the population parameters and past observations. ηt represents the
vector whose jth element is the conditional density given by 2, and the symbol 
denotes element by element multiplication. ξˆt|t−1 is defined by:
ξˆt|t =
(ξˆt|t−1  ηt)
1′(ξˆt|t−1  ηt)
(3)
ξˆt+1|t = P.ξˆt|t, (4)
P represents the transition matrix given earlier. With a starting value ξˆ1|0 and
an assumed value for the population parameter vector θ, we can use equations 3 and
4 recursively for t = 1, 2, ..., T to find the values of ξˆt|t and ξˆt+1|t for each date in the
sample.
We later allow covariates to affect the probability persistence in each state, specif-
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ically:
P11 =
e(γ1X)
1 + e(γ1X)
(5)
P22 =
e(γ2X)
1 + e(γ2X)
(6)
Throughout the paper, γs describes these coefficients in the state persistence
equation. We use a ‘logistic transformation’ to ensure that these probabilities are
bounded between zero and one. In order to further investigate the nature of this
persistence in the long term, we also estimate ergodic probabilities (denoted λs)
using the eigenvectors of these transition probabilities (see Hamilton (1994)).2 Using
these we can calculate the unconditional variance of our two-state model using the
following formulae:
E(r) = λ1E(r1) + λ2E(r2)
= λ1µ1 + λ2µ2
E(r2) = λ1E(r
2
1) + λ2E(r
2
2)
= λ1[V ar(r1) + µ
2
1] + λ2[V ar(r2) + µ
2
2]
= λ1[σ1 + µ
2
1] + λ2[σ2 + µ
2
2]
V ar(r) = E(r2)− [E(r)2]
To estimate the variance covariance matrix for our parameter estimates we use the
Outer Product of Gradients (denoted OPG) method, described by Greene (2008).3
2The ergodic probabilities are those eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalues equal to one.
3We also investigated using the ”Sandwich” Estimator as described by Davidson and MacKinnon
(2004), however came to the conclusion that for our purposes the OPG estimator was satisfactory.
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2 Data
We consider monthly average spot prices from the Brazilian Electricity market.
The market itself is divied into four regions: South-East/Central West, South, North-
East and North (denoted SECO, S, NE and N). The raw time series plots of these
price series are shown in Appendix A. The analysis in this paper focuses on the data
from the SECO region of Brazil, as it is the largest in size and electricity usage.
4 The dependent variable in our model is the return series, calculated as the log-
difference in monthly prices. There are three independent time series variables in
our data set. The first is a binary variable representing post-reform, equal to zero
before March 2004 and equal to one otherwise. The second is energia armazenada or
stored energy (denoted EAR) measured in monthly mean Mega Watts (MW). The
EAR is a measure of electricity related to the volume of water stored in a reservoir or
watershed. The calculation takes into account the productivity of the hydroelectric
plants downstream and disregards the dead volume (regular minimal volume of the
reservoir). In particular,
EAR(MWmed) =
1
2, 6298
∗ (Vi(hm3)− V min(hm3)) ∗ (prodeqi(MW/m3/s)
+
m∑
j=1
prodeqj(MW/m
3/s)),
where, Vi is the volume stored in the reservoir i, Vmin is the dead volume or
minimal regular volume of reservoir i, prodeqi is the equivalent productivity of hydro
plant associated with reservoir i, and prodeqj is the equivalent productivity of the
m hydro plants downstream of reservoir i. m3 denotes cubic metres, hm3 denotes
cubic hectometres, and s stands for second. The final control variable is energia
natural afluente or natural hydropower (denoted ENA), also measured in monthly
4We include a table of results from our final model in Appendix C, should anyone wish to
investigate the model fitted to other regions.
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Deseasonalised Variables Non-Deseasonalised Variables
Returns EAR
(10GW/month)
ENA
(10GW/month)
Returns EAR
(10GW/month)
ENA
(10GW/month)
mean 0.0000 0.0298 -0.0053 0.0103 11.4852 3.2769
median 0.0274 0.9148 -0.0564 0.0000 12.0982 2.8252
std. dev. 0.4585 2.9391 0.9547 0.4743 3.5778 1.6418
min -1.8714 -9.2194 -3.0971 -1.9129 3.3196 1.1405
max 1.1968 4.8544 3.7594 1.3370 17.4172 9.1575
skewness -0.4619 -1.1069 0.6945 -0.4793 -0.5341 1.1327
kurtosis 4.6206 4.1170 6.3711 4.5269 2.3700 4.0763
Table 1: Summary Statistics from the SECO region dataset, where EAR denotes
energia armazenada or stored energy and ENA denotes energia natural afluente or
natural hydropower. Note deseasonalisation was achieved by regressing on dummies
for months 1-11 and an intercept, and saving the residuals.
mean MW. The ENA is the aggregate amount of electricity that can be generated
by the natural hydraulic inflow to each hydro plant in a river, not considering the
interference of the upstream plants. In particular,
ENA(t) =
n∑
i=1
(Qnat(i,t) ∗ p(i))
Where, i refers to a specific hydro-plant of a considered watershed, t is the time
interval considered (in our case a month), Qnat(i,t) is the natural hydraulic inflow to
plant i in period t, and p(i) is the average productivity of hydro plant i taking into
account 65% of its maximum useful storage level and the average downstream level.
We gathered this data from ONS, who collects the hydro plants technical information
and calculates the equivalent productivities. The definitions were sourced from ONS
(2010) and Energy (2015).
These two continuous variables are interesting in our model because, for a largely
hydroelectric system such as Brazil, the level of potential energy stored in the reser-
voirs and the quantity of kinetic energy generated purely through rainfall are likely
to have a substantial effect on electricity pricing, as they are likely to affect the
supply decisions taken by generators. For our estimation ENA and EAR are scaled
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down by 10,000, thus giving us the monthly means measured in units of 10 Giga
Watts (GW). In order to remove seasonal effects, we seperately regressed each of
returns, EAR and ENA on an intercept and dummy variables for months 1-11, then
saved the residuals as the deseasonalised series. Plots of these series (pre- and post-
deseasonalising) are given in Appendix A. Some descriptive statistics of these series
are given in Table 1. The observations begin in September 2000 and run till March
2014. The market reform to a structure similar to that of a single buyer market took
place in March 2004.
3 Results
3.1 Building our model
We first estimate the model with no independent variables and simple Markov
switching probabilities, then build in the dummy variable reform and then the covari-
ates EAR and ENA in the mean, volatility and probability equations.5 The results
from this estimation are found in Table 2, with standard errors in parenthesis.
As a first step, we estimate a two-state regression without covariates (see column
one). In this initial model, State 1 experiences positive drift, with log prices rising by
4.9% per month on average, and low volatility of e−1.7759 = 0.1693, indicating that
returns generally vary by around 17%. This state has a probability of persisting of
0.89. State 2 experiences low negative drift of around 1.7% in log prices. Volatility
is higher in this state, at e−0.6527 = 0.52064, and persistence of State 2 is more likely,
with a probability of 0.96. Initially at least, the model describes a relatively good
state with positive drift and low volatility, and a relatively bad state with negative
drift and high volatility.
In column two we introduce the reform variable into the mean equation. The
results show that, all other things remaining the same, post-reform drift tends to
5More in depth progression of results can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: The probability of persisting in State 2, the more volatile state, over time,
generated with only the binary variable reform (equalling one post-reform) included
in the return and volatility equations. (See column 4 of table 2.)
increase (ie. prices have grown more post reform).
In column three, we also introduce EAR and ENA to the mean equation. The
trend of reform increasing returns remains. As we would expect, ENA (naturally
occuring hydropower from unexpected rainfall) generally has a negative effect on
returns. In contrast, EAR does not appear to have a consistent effect, but rather
it switches from positive to negative depending on the state. This may be due to
the different decision making that occurs at high or low levels of rainfall, which is
discussed further in Section 3.3.
Column 4 contains the results from including reform in the mean and volatility
equations. Now that reform can also explain changes in volatility, the effect on
drift alters. In one state the reform increases returns and in the other it decreases
them. However, the reform appears to have had a significantly dampening effect
on volatility, in both states. We also plot the probability of state persistence over
time, as shown in Figure 2, with a reference line at the date of first law change for
reform. The figure clearly shows that with only reform included, the series spends
the majority of the time in State 2, the more volatile state.
In column 5 we see the estimated coefficients including all three covariates in
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Figure 3: The probability of persisting in State 2, the more volatile state, over time,
generated from the model with reform, EAR and ENA included as covariates in the
return and volatility equations. (See column 5 of table 2.)
both the mean and volatility equations. The series begins in State 1, and it is the
more persistent state. Pre-reform, State 1 is characterised by low positive drift and
low mean volatility, and State 2 experiences high negative drift and high volatility.
The series begins in State 1, and it is the more persistent state. Post-reform, we find
State 1 remains relatively similar, with low positive drift and low volatility. State 2
however becomes characterised by higher positive drift and very low volatility. EAR
tends to positively affect returns and volatility in one state, and negatively affect
returns and volatility in the other state (perhaps counter-intuitively6). ENA has a
consistently negative effect on returns, but not so on volatility - in one state is has
a positive effect and in the other a negative effect.
We plot the probability of state persistence for this model in Figure 3. It is
apparent that after the inclusion of covariates, the probability of lying in one state
or another becomes less clear cut.
We next include covariates in estimated state persistence. As the states them-
selves change after the reforms, the persistence of each one is unlikely to be the same
6We experimented with various transformations of the EAR variable, looking for an intuitive
relationship. In particular, we were expecting to find a negative correlation between EAR and
volatility in the model. We investigated squared EAR, logged EAR, and dummy variables for
different levels, however as none returned a consistently negative pair of estimated delta values, we
proceed with the current variable.
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Figure 4: The probability of persisting in State 2, the more volatile state, over time,
generated from the model including only the binary variable reform ( 0 pre reform,
1 otherwise) as a covariate in the return, volatility and probability equations.
for the whole period but rather change with the states. We include covariates in
the probability equation in order to better understand the treatment effect that the
reform produced.
Our first foray into more complex modelling of state persistence involves including
only reform in the mean, volatility and probability equations (see column 6). From
this initial estimation, we find that there continues to be a low volatility state and a
high volatility state, and post reform, both of these volatilities decrease. We plot the
corresponding state persistence probabilities in Figure 4. This figure paints a rather
unsettling picture: from this estimation, although the reforms decreased volatilities
in the good and bad states, post-reform the series appears to become effectively stuck
in the high volatility state.
To further investigate this phenomenon, we used the eigenvectors of the transition
matrices to find the ergodic probabilities, that is, the long term probabilities of the
series being in each state. The value in row one of the following matricies is λ1, and
that in the second row is λ2.
ergodic probabilitiespre =
 0.6460
0.3540

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ergodic probabilitiespost =
 1.2567e− 06
1

As is apparent from these ergodic probabilities and Figure 4, according to this
model, post-reform State 2 is an absorbing state - once in State 2 there is no transi-
tioning back to State 1. This model does not include EAR and ENA, so this is not
yet a conclusive interpretation of the outcome. For this single case, the final step
included calculating the model’s variance:
V ar(rpre) = 0.22308
V ar(rpost) = 0.21525
The model variance for the post-reform period is lower than that of the pre-reform
period.
Intuitively, the combination of EAR and ENA should affect whether the market
moves to or remains in a volatile state. For this reason, in the final column we
include these covariates in the probability equations as well as the mean and volatility
equations. Having now built the model to its most informative structure we proceeed
to analyse the treatment effect of the reform.
3.2 Results from the final case
Before the reforms, State 1 has negative drift of approximately 11% in log prices,
and low mean volatility at e−1.5256 = 0.2175. 11% negative drift implies we would be
expecting prices to be dropping by 1−e−0.11 = 0.10 - approximately 10%. State 2 has
high negative drift of 167%, (translating into an expectation of prices plummeting by
1−e−1.67 = 0.81 - approximately 81%) and high mean volatility at e−1.2768 = 0.27893.
These results have large standard errors, due to a paucity of State 2 observations pre
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reform on which to base coefficient variances. This is made clear by figure 5, in which
we plot the conditional probability of being in State 2 over time. There were only
two observations where P(S=2) is high pre-reform (at times 17 and 18). Naturally,
the model finds estimating a variance form these observations rather daunting. Post-
reform drift in State 1 increases by 16%, giving the State a mean drift of −0.1070 +
0.1633 = 0.0563. This can be interpreted as a low positive drift of 5.6% in log prices.
In State 2, reform increases mean returns by 1.5448, giving a mean drift of -0.1252; a
negative drift of 12.5%. Figure 5 also shows that post-reform, the market has spent
extended periods of time in the volatile State 2. This implies that post-reform, the
market was periodically volatile and experiencing negative drift.
Volatility changed post-reform: in State 1 the reform decreased mean log volatility
by 0.0515, leaving a mean volatilty of e−1.5256−0.0515 = 0.20657. In State 2, on average,
reform increased log volatility by 0.1118, leaving a mean volatility of e−1.2768+0.1118 =
0.31192. Thus, post-reform State 2 is still the more volatile state. EAR has a small
negative effect on returns in State 1, and a larger positive effect on returns in State 2.
The same relationship occurs for volatility of the model: in State 1, EAR negatively
affects volatility, and in State 2 it has a positive effect. By comparison ENA has a
consistently negative effect on both returns and volatility in both states.
The probability equations in this case also yield interesting results. The gamma
coefficients tell us what increases and decreases the likelihood of persisting in one or
other of the states. In State 1, we see that the reform decreases state persistence,
EAR increases state persistence, and ENA decreases it. These estimates are all
within the common scale of the previous coefficients. However, State 2 produces
quite a different picture. While the direction of the effects are the same in State
2, the γ coefficents lie within |300 to 800|, much higher in absolute value than the
previous state. This translates into either a very high likelihood of State 2 persisting,
or a very low likelihood of State 2 persisting, depending on the values of EAR and
ENA. 7
7To further investigate the high values that γ takes, we performed log-likelihood ratio tests on
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Figure 5: Probability of persisting in State 2 (the volatile state) over time from the
final model, in which we include the binary variable reform, EAR (the deseasonalised
stored energy), and ENA (the deseasonalised natural hydropower) in all three equa-
tions - return, volatility and state persistence. The vertical red line represents the
reform.
In summary, pre-reform State 1 was characterised by low negative drift and low
volatility, and State 2 by high negative drift and high volatility. Post-reform, State
1 has low positive drift and low volatility, and in State 2 we find low negative drift
and higher volatility. We can infer that being in State 2 is more dangerous in terms
of market stability. A reasonable question to then pose is: which combinations of
EAR and ENA lead to high persistence of State 2. Or put another way: when is
there a risk of a prolonged energy crisis?
3.3 The EAR/ENA Effect
In this section, we discuss the effect that the EAR to ENA ratio has on the elec-
tricity market’s stability. The question is at what combinations of EAR and ENA
are we finding the system at risk of peristing in the volatile State 2. To answer this
these coefficients. The results are found in Appendix B.
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we numerically found the combinations that set the probability of persisting in State
2 equal to e0/(1 + e0) = 0.5, computed seperately pre and post reform. Were this
probability to increase, the market would be in a kind of “danger zone”, since if it
falls out of State 1 it is likely to remain in State 2 for more than one period. We
report these relationships in figure 6, where they are plotted in blue. The “safe zone”
is below this line.
We also performed cointegration analysis on these covariates to analyse their
behaviour in relation to one another. We perform the analysis on the pre- and post-
reform periods seperately, to yield:
ˆEARpre = −2.072
(0.4959)
+ 2.131
(0.5543)
ENApre
ˆdiff,pre = −0.1735
(0.0865)
lag,pre
ˆEARpost = 1.0072
(0.1480)
+ 1.0615
(0.1525)
ENApost
ˆdiff,post = −0.0981
(0.0499)
lag,post
The intercepts and coefficients on ENA in the first regressions shown above de-
scribe the ratios of EAR to ENA tending to occur in the model. The negative
coefficients on lag in the second lines of regression show that, both pre- and post-
reform, there is mean reversion. These critical mean-reverting ratios are also plotted
in figure 6, in red.
There are several key results apparent from these graphs. Firstly, from the scat-
ter of points it is apparent that deseasonalised EAR and deseasonalised ENA are
positively correlated. This makes intuitive sense: how generators react to unsea-
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Figure 6: In these figures we see blue lines indicating the combination of deseason-
alised EAR and deseasonalised ENA that will yield P22=0.5. (Below these lines
we are in a safe zone.) Red lines indicate the mean reversion line given the actual
coordinates from the dataset, represented by the circles.
sonal rainfall levels is likely to depend largely on how much water is already in their
reservoirs or water sheds. For example, if deseasonalised ENA is low, indicating that
the season is drier than would be expected, it is natural that the amount of water
allowed to sit in the reservoirs (not generating electricity) would fall. This is due
to the demand for electricity generation still being present, leading to the genera-
tors running reserves through the system. This would lead to a deseasonalised EAR
proportionally lower than zero based on the severity or duration of the drought. In
contrast, a generator could be excused for storing water during times of high rainfall.
Comparing the blue lines pre- and post- reform shows that the “safe zone” has in-
creased in size, as the line shifted up post-reform. This implies that the generators
are working within a more forgiving environment - they are able to store more water
in general, while running less risk of bringing about volatile electricity returns. In
this sense, the reform appears to have had a positive effect.
Studying the mean reversion lines is equally interesting. The red line pre re-
form is significantly steeper. If we were able to infer this relationship held at all
levels of ENA, this would imply that the market players pre regulation tended to
19
react strongly to unseasonal rainfall levels - lower than usual rain would prompt less
hoarding of water, and higher rain would be utilised by more hoarding taking place.
However we must note that we cannot see how the free market performed in times of
high deseasonalised ENA. As such, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions on how
the market would have behaved in times of high rainfall.
Comparing the full graphs pre and post reform shows that though the safe zone
became larger, the mean reversion of control variables post-reform does not not
always fall in this zone. Pre reform, we see that for low levels of ENA, EAR is
generally safely allocated well below the danger line. It is important to recall here
that State 2 pre reform is based on only two observations, meaning it is unlikely to
be conclusive. We must also wonder as to why the market experienced soaring prices
and a shortage of supply given that this was the case. 8 Post reform, the mean
reversion line is relatively closer to the danger line. In times of high rainfall after
regulation, the allocation of EAR was often rather too high - leading to P22 > 0.5.
This indicates that while the capacity to increase EAR without becoming at risk
of falling into State 2 increased, the management of unseasonal EAR as a ratio to
unseasonal ENA has perhaps not been as successful post-reform.
In figure 7 we see the probabilities of persisting in State 1 or 2 over time. Pre
reform, P22 iss high for one month at t=18, for 2 months at t=29-30, and for 4 months
between t=32-36. We know that at time 17 & 18, the conditional probability of being
in state 2 iss high. Without more data is is difficult to draw more conclusions from
this period. Post-reform, the system seems to have spent long periods of time at
risk of persisting in State 2 should it fall out of State 1, shown by the prolonged
periods at P(22)=1 in figure 7. As such, though the volatility of State 1 decreased
post reform, the risk of a prolonged period of time spent in State 2 is greater.
8Recall that the reforms were implemented partially in response to the rationing that occured
between June 2001 and February 2002.
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Figure 7: Probabilities of state persistence over time, for the final case, where we
include all three covariates (the binary variable reform - equalling one after March
2004, EAR - the deseasonalised stored energy measure, and ENA - the deseason-
alised natural hydropower measure) in all three equations - return, volatility and
probability. State 1 is the more preferable state, with lower volatility.
4 Conclusion
We find that between September 2000 and February 2004, the South-Eastern/Central
Western region of the Brazilian electricity market was characterised by low negative
drift and low volatility in electricity returns. However there were high prices during
2001, corresponding to electricity rationing between June 2001 to February 2002.
This led to the market reform in March 2004, and the creation of the RCE. The
reformed market is comparable to a single buyer market due to the degree of control
in the hands of the regulators.
Post-reform, the market is characterised by two states. State 1 experiences low
positive drift in log prices and low volatility in returns. Volatility improves from the
pre-reform period to this state post-reform. In State 2, we find low negative drift and
higher volatility. In this state, volatility increases post-reform. The system switches
between these states often, and spends some prolonged periods in State 2, which we
characterise as energy “crises”.
Furthermore we find that the combination of deseasonalised EAR to deseason-
alised ENA is instrumental in the transition between states. In particular, the ratio
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of EAR to ENA is a key determinant of the likelihood of persisting in the crisis state,
should the series fall into it. The reform allows generators more freedom in allocating
EAR given levels of ENA. However, the allocation of EAR to ENA appears to be
outside the safe zone regardless of this, leading to prolonged crises.
Possible future work could involve similar econometric analysis, but including the
entirety of the Brazilian electricity market, taking into account all four regions and
allowing them to interact.
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5 Appendix
A Plots and Correlations
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(b) deseasonalised returns
Figure 8: return series in the SECO region
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(b) deseasonalised stored energy
Figure 9: stored energy series in the SECO region
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(a) natural hydropower
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Figure 10: natural hydropower series in the SECO region
Correlations
corr(r,EAR) -0.054367
corr(r2,EAR) -0.021051
corr(r,ENA) -0.43393
corr(r2,ENA) -0.05723
Table 3: Correlations between deseasonalised returns or squared returns and desea-
sonalised EAR (stored energy) or deseasonalised ENA (natural hydropower).
B Test Results
T-test results
coeff estimate se t-stat
β1,1 -0.1107 (0.0566) -1.9561
β1,2 0.2299 (0.1706) 1.3478
δ1,1 -0.4312 (0.3278) -1.3154
δ1,2 -0.2747 (0.1710) -1.6063
Table 4: Testing the significance of the binary control variable reform in the simple
model (no other covariates included)
For our nested model, the log-likelihood test statistic is calulated as
D = 2ln(likelihood for null model)− 2ln(likelihood for alternate model)
where the null is the special case of the alternative where γ1 is restricted to a value
of zero. For the case including only reform, when the restriction is that γ1 is set to
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zero:
D = 2(85.646)− 2(84.208)
= 2.876 ∼ χ2(df=1)
Compared to the chi-squared critical value (for 95% confidence and 1 df) of 3.841
- we do not reject the null.
Log-L ratio test results
Case Restriction Test stat
reform only in all three equations γ1 = 0 2.876
volatility contains all covariates, otherwise only reform γ1 = 0 4.4988
volatility contains all covariates, otherwise only reform γ2 = 0 0.9292
Table 5: Results from testing the significance of the gamma coefficients. (Note:
critical values for the chi-squared distribution with 1df are 3.841 for 0.95 confidence
and 6.635 for 0.99 confidence.)
C Further Results
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tResults from the Markov Switching Model with simple probability estimation
Basic Model Including reform Incorporating EAR and ENA
coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se
µ1 0.0490 (0.0294) -1.6628 (0.1911) 0.1011 (0.0486) -0.0224 (0.0869) -0.0039 (0.0655) 0.0315 (0.0832)
µ2 -0.0172 (0.0494) 0.0258 (0.0757) -0.2048 (0.1632) -2.0697 (2.8680) -0.4202 (0.2378) -0.4096 (0.2332)
δ1intercept -1.7759 (0.1539) -1.6215 (0.6410) -1.6806 (0.2714) -1.1781 (0.0755) -1.6170 (0.2143) -1.5260 (0.2788)
δ2intercept -0.6527 (0.0659) -0.9288 (0.0688) -0.4575 (0.1497) -0.4145 (0.8609) -0.3722 (0.2335) 1.2825 (0.7551)
P11 0.8886 (0.0820) 0.4249 (0.2467) 0.9002 (0.0774) 0.9773 (0.0317) 0.9434 (0.0428) 0.7411 (0.1028)
P22 0.9600 (0.0307) 0.9599 (0.0426) 0.9661 (0.0267) 0.6619 (0.3483) 0.8273 (0.0904) 0.4140 (0.1670)
P0 0.0000 (1.1523) 0.0001 (2.5986) 0. 0000 (1.1513) 0.0000 (3.7242) 0.0000 (1.2819) 0.9999 (7.6862
β1reform 1.0063 (0.2279) -0.1107 (0.0566) 0.0623 (0.1031) 0.0600 (0.0926) -0.0071 (0.1180)
β1ear 0.0425 (0.0143) 0.0368 (0.0137) 0.0607 (0.0208)
β1ena -0.3209 (0.0312) -0.3495 (0.0479) -0.2749 (0.0440)
β2reform 0.0447 (0.0928) 0.2299 (0.1705) 2.7041 (3.6712) 0.4559 (0.2492) 0.4589 (0.2182)
β2ear -0.3518 (0.5836) 0.0001 (0.0248) -0.0154 (0.0250)
β2ena -0.0822 (0.6585) -0.1771 (0.0413) -0.5805 (0.0459)
δ1reform -0.4312 (0.3278) 0.6344 (0.2332) 0.4331 (0.3566)
δ1ear -0.0672 (0.0621)
δ1ena 0.0353 (0.1195)
δ2reform -0.2747 (0.1710) -1.4800 (0.3344) -3.3603 (0.9349)
δ2ear 0.6023 (0.1348)
δ2ena -0.4255 (0.3717)
Table 6: Results - probability type 1
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t
Markov Switching Model results with reform in the probability estimation
coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se
µ1 0.1021 (0.0428 0.0112 (0.0627) -1.6766 (3.5708) 0.0630 (0.0766)
µ2 -0.2903 (0.2114) -0.7378 (0.4302) -0.0053 (0.0647) -0.0723 (0.1772)
δ1intercept -1.6567 (0.2185) -1.6241 (0.2188) -1.5486 (259.6 ) -1.9730 (0.5850)
δ2intercept -0.3836 (0.1747) -0.4021 (0.2873) -1.4030 (0.2988) -0.1876 (0.2306)
γ1intercept 2.0355 (1.1441) 2.4421 (1.4954) -0.0021 (2.0363) 21.8151 (14230157)
γ2intercept 1.3200 (0.8760) 1.3697 (0.9875) 3.6374 (1.9668) 3.2114 (1.3709)
P0 0.0000 (1.2366) 0.0000 (1.4585) 0.0001 (2.2030) 0.0000 (1.1826)
β1reform -0.1128 (0.0550) 0.0385 (0.0827) 1.6878 (3.5712) -0.0821 (0.1215)
β1ear 0.0372 (0.0123) 0.0337 (0.0306)
β1ena -0.3198 (0.0317) -0.1371 (0.0603)
β2reform 0.3129 (0.2161) 0.3206 (0.4484) 0.0008 (0.0719) 0.1024 (0.1811)
β2ear -0.1902 (0.0618) 0.0417 (0.0163)
β2ena 0.3642 (0.1167) -0.3278 (0.0404)
δ1reform -0.4582 (0.2992) 0.5509 (0.2262) 0.7639 (259.6 ) 0.0397 (0.9461)
δ1ear 0.0194 (0.0507) -0.0462 (0.1596)
δ1ena -0.0279 (0.0897) -0.2132 (0.6005)
δ2reform -0.3843 (0.1899) -4.6508 (1.3515) -0.5570 (0.4126) -0.9361 (0.2591)
δ2ear -0.0447 (0.0772) 0.0883 (0.0346)
δ2ena -0.1934 (0.2406) -0.0526 (0.0896)
γ1reform 0.4863 (1.9679) 1.3191 (1.8572) 18.2129 (135446) -19.2603 (14230157)
γ2reform 14.8660 (15970) -1.9946 (2.2464) -1.0883 (2.5118) 15.8057 (882825)
P11-pre 0.8845 0.9200 0.4995 1
P22-pre 0.7892 0.7973 0.9744 0.96126
P11-post 0.9257 0.9773 1 0.92789
P22-post 1 0.3487 0.92751 1
Table 7: Progression of results from estimation of the mean and volatility
equations containing all three covariates; the dummy for reform, EAR
- deseasonalised stored energy in 10GW/month and ENA - natural hy-
dropower also measured in 10GW/month, and where the probability
equations include the variable reform.
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Markov Switching Model results with covariates in probability estimation
coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se
µ1 -1.5270 (1071496) 0.1039 (0.0528 ) 0.0136 (0.0985 ) -0.1070 (0.0746 )
µ2 -0.0759 (0.0917) -0.3467 (0.2310 ) -1.3973 (0.2409 ) -1.6700 (750.002)
δ0,1 -9.2103 (1016945) -1.5645 (0.2758 ) -1.1470 (0.2086 ) -1.5256 (0.2763 )
δ0,2 -1.0956 (0.1093) -0.3024 (0.3718 ) 1.5445 (1.6519 ) -1.2768 (36767.97)
γ0,1 -3.9369 (145457831776) 0.6192 (1.5812 ) 18618 (3826.16) 9.2473 (17.0049 )
γ0,1 7.0704 (8.5401 ) 12.3113 (24.5898) 0.0571 (2.1742 ) 374.905 (150.7521)
P0 1.0000 (71.6609) 0.0000 (2.5095) 0.9999 (3.0785 ) 0.0000 (564.0379)
β1reform 1.2752 (1071496) 0.1502 (0.0671 ) 0.0038 (0.1330 ) 0.1633 (0.0849 )
β1ear 0.1321 (0.0562) 0.0554 (0.0230 ) -0.0041 (0.0193 )
β1ena -0.1752 (0.1179) -0.3952 (0.0523 ) -0.2156 (0.0283 )
β2reform 0.1136 (0.1134) 0.0017 (0.2387 ) 1.3796 (0.2086 ) 1.5448 (750.0043)
β2ear 0.0382 (0.0184) -0.1956 (0.0321 ) 0.1235 (0.0573 )
β2ena -0.3676 (0.0483) 0.0562 (0.0334 ) -0.3725 (0.0802 )
δ1reform 7.5227 (1016945) -0.0412 (0.3310 ) -0.0023 (0.2948 ) -0.0515 (0.2834 )
δ1ear 0.1250 (0.0530 ) 0.0283 (0.0499 ) -0.0953 (0.0620 )
δ1ena -0.8106 (0.1685 ) 0.0612 (0.0975 ) -0.0617 (0.1266 )
δ2reform 0.0039 (0.1270) -1.0294 (0.5073 ) -3.4498 (1.6269 ) 0.1118 (36767.99)
δ2ear 0.0909 (0.1049 ) 0.4188 (0.2777 ) 0.0985 (0.1284 )
δ2ena -0.0076 (0.2012 ) 0.8663 (0.5088 ) -0.0366 (0.1516 )
γ1reform -93.7069 (656.1142) -0.0047 (2.1612 ) -1.4570 (3.1466 ) -5.5647 (12.0504 )
γ1ear 12.5501 (305617468832) 0.5408 (0.5208 ) 0.0064 (0.0456) 1.4154 (3.4384 )
γ1ena -22.9525 (2003893) -7.1223 (4.4987 ) -8.6273 (13.7484 )
γ2reform -2.9122 (5.0965) -18.3309 (29.6405) -10643 (807.505) -758.721 (42.0371 )
γ2ear 1.0526 (1.6246) -0.5575 (1.6278 ) 627.67 (27.5976) 445.9035 (526.2325)
γ2ena -5.1024 (6.5064) 27.3835 (37.7602) -367.484 (147.8976)
Table 8: Results from the Two-State Markov Switching model with
covariates (the dummy for reform, EAR - deseasonalised stored en-
ergy in 10GW/month and ENA - natural hydropower also measured in
10GW/month) included in the return, volatility, and probability equations.
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